Garcillano VS House of Representatives g.r. no 170338
Facts:More than three years ago, tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped conversation purportedly between the President of the Philippines and a high-ranking official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) surfaced. They captured unprecedented public attention and thrust the country into a controversy that placed the legitimacy of the present administration on the line, and resulted in the near-collapse of the Arroyo government. The tapes, notoriously referred to as the "Hello Garci" tapes, allegedly contained the President’s instructions to COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano to manipulate in her favor results of the 2004 presidential elections. These recordings were to become the subject of heated legislative hearings conducted separately by committees of both Houses of Congress.
In the House of Representatives (House), on June 8, 2005, then Minority Floor Leader Francis G. Escudero delivered a privilege speech, "Tale of Two Tapes," and set in motion a congressional investigation jointly conducted by the Committees on Public Information, Public Order and Safety, National Defense and Security, Information and Communications Technology, and Suffrage and Electoral Reforms (respondent House Committees). During the inquiry, several versions of the wiretapped conversation emerged. But on July 5, 2005, National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Director Reynaldo Wycoco, Atty. Alan Paguia and the lawyer of former NBI Deputy Director Samuel Ong submitted to the respondent House Committees seven alleged "original" tape recordings of the supposed three-hour taped conversation. After prolonged and impassioned debate by the committee members on the admissibility and authenticity of the recordings, the tapes were eventually played in the chambers of the House.
Alarmed by these developments, petitioner Virgilio O. Garcillano (Garcillano) filed with this Court a Petition for Prohibition and Injunction, with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction docketed as G.R. No. 170338 praying that the respondent House Committees be restrained from using these tape recordings of the "illegally obtained" wiretapped conversations in their committee reports and for any other purpose. He further implored that the said recordings and any reference thereto be ordered stricken off the records of the inquiry, and the respondent House Committees directed to desist from further using the recordings in any of the House proceedings. Without reaching its denouement, the House discussion and debates on the "Garci tapes" abruptly stopped.
After more than two years of quiescence, Senator Panfilo Lacson roused the slumbering issue with a privilege speech, "The Lighthouse That Brought Darkness." In his discourse, Senator Lacson promised to provide the public "the whole unvarnished truth – the what’s, when’s, where’s, who’s and why’s" of the alleged wiretap, and sought an inquiry into the perceived willingness of telecommunications providers to participate in nefarious wiretapping activities. On motion of Senator Francis Pangilinan, Senator Lacson’s speech was referred to the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security, chaired by Senator Rodolfo Biazon, who had previously filed two bills seeking to regulate the sale, purchase and use of wiretapping equipment and to prohibit the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) from performing electoral duties.
In the Senate’s plenary session the following day, a lengthy debate ensued when Senator Richard Gordon aired his concern on the possible transgression of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4200 if the body were to conduct a legislative inquiry on the matter. On August 28, 2007, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago delivered a privilege speech, articulating her considered view that the Constitution absolutely bans the use, possession, replay or communication of the contents of the "Hello Garci" tapes. However, she recommended a legislative investigation into the role of the Intelligence Service of the AFP (ISAFP), the Philippine National Police or other government entities in the alleged illegal wiretapping of public officials.
On September 6, 2007, petitioners Santiago Ranada and Oswaldo Agcaoili, retired justices of the Court of Appeals, filed before this Court a Petition for Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, docketed as G.R. No. 179275, seeking to bar the Senate from conducting its scheduled legislative inquiry. They argued in the main that the intended legislative inquiry violates R.A. No. 4200 and Section 3, Article III of the Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not publication in the internet is sufficient to satisfy the publication requirement?
Held: The Court does not agree. The absence of any amendment to the rules cannot justify the Senate’s defiance of the clear and unambiguous language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. The organic law instructs, without more, that the Senate or its committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation only in accordance with duly published rules of procedure, and does not make any distinction whether or not these rules have undergone amendments or revision. The constitutional mandate to publish the said rules prevails over any custom, practice or tradition followed by the Senate.
Justice Carpio’s response to the same argument raised by the respondents is illuminating:
The publication of the Rules of Procedure in t he publication of the rules, because it can do so only “in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure.”In the website of the Senate, or in pamphlet form available at the Senate, is not sufficient under the Tañada v. Tuvera ruling which requires publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. The Rules of Procedure even provide that the rules “shall take effect seven (7) days after publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation,” precluding any other form of publication. Publication in accordance with Tañada is mandatory to comply with the due process requirement because the Rules of Procedure put a person’s liberty at risk. A person who violates the Rules of Procedure could be arrested and detained by the Senate.
The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792, otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid publication through the internet is all the more incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as the functional equivalent of a written document only for evidentiary purposes. In other words, the law merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being the original) of electronic data messages and/or electronic documents. It does not make the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules and regulations.
Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in violation of the Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have caused the publication of the rules.
Ang Vs. Pascua G.R. No 182835
Facts:The evidence for the prosecution shows that complainant Irish and accused Rustan were classmates at Wesleyan University in Aurora Province
Before Rustan got married, however, he got in touch with Irish and tried to convince her to elope with him, saying that he did not love the woman he was about to marry. Irish rejected the proposal and told Rustan to take on his responsibility to the other woman and their child. Irish changed her cellphone number but Rustan somehow managed to get hold of it and sent her text messages. .
On June 5, 2005 , Irish received through MMS a picture of a naked woman with spread legs and with Irish’s face on the figure.After she got the obscene picture, Irish got other text messages from Rustan. He boasted that it would be easy for him to create similarly scandalous pictures of her. And he threatened to spread the picture he sent through the internet.
Irish sought the help of the vice mayor who referred her to the police. Under police supervision, Irish contacted Rustan through the cellphone numbers he used in sending the picture and his text messages. Irish asked Rustan to meet her at the Lorentess Resort , and he did. He came in a motorcycle. After parking it, he walked towards Irish but the waiting police officers intercepted and arrested him. They searched him and seized his Sony Ericsson P900 cellphone and several SIM cards.
Joseph Gonzales, an instructor at the Aurora State College of Technology, testified as an expert in information technology and computer graphics. He said that it was very much possible for one to lift the face of a woman from a picture and superimpose it on the body of another woman in another picture. Pictures can be manipulated and enhanced by computer to make it appear that the face and the body belonged to just one person.
Gonzales testified that the picture in question had two distinct irregularities: the face was not proportionate to the body and the face had a lighter color. In his opinion, the picture was fake and the face on it had been copied. Finally, Gonzales explained how this could be done, transferring a picture from a computer to a cellphone like the Sony Ericsson P900 seized from Rustan.
For his part, Rustan claimed that after their relation ended, Irish wanted reconciliation. Sometime later, Rustan got a text message from Irish, asking him to meet her at Lorentess Resort as she needed his help in selling her cellphone. When he arrived at the place, two police officers approached him, seized his cellphone and the contents of his pockets, and brought him to the police station.
Rustan further claims that he also went to Lorentess because Irish asked him to help her identify a prankster who was sending her malicious text messages. Rustan got the sender’s number and, pretending to be Irish, contacted the person. Rustan claims that he got back obscene messages from the prankster, which he forwarded to Irish from his cellphone. This explained, he said, why the obscene messages appeared to have originated from his cellphone number. Rustan claims that it was Irish herself who sent the obscene picture to him. He presented six pictures of a woman whom he identified as Irish
Michelle, Rustan’s wife, testified that she was sure Irish sent the six pictures. Michelle claims that she received the pictures and hid the memory card that contained them because she was jealous and angry. She did not want to see anything of Irish. But, while the woman in the pictures posed in sexy clothing, in none did she appear naked as in Exhibit A. Further, the face of the woman in Exhibits 2, 4, 5 and 6 could not be seen. Irish denied that she was the woman in those four pictures. As for Exhibits 3 and 7, the woman in the picture was fully dressed.
After trial, the RTC found Irish’s testimony completely credible, given in an honest and spontaneous manner. The RTC observed that she wept while recounting her experience, prompting the court to comment: “Her tears were tangible expression of pain and anguish for the acts of violence she suffered in the hands of her former sweetheart. The crying of the victim during her testimony is evidence of the credibility of her charges with the verity borne out of human nature and experience.” The RTC found Rustan guilty of the violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262.
Issues: 1)Whether or not the RTC properly admitted in evidence the obscene picture presented in the case.
2)Whether or not a single act of harassment, like the sending of the nude picture in this case, already constitutes a violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262;
Held: 1) The elements of the crime of violence against women through harassment are:
1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman;
2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series of acts of harassment against the woman; and
3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to her.
Rustan argues that the one act of sending an offensive picture should not be considered a form of harassment. He claims that such would unduly ruin him personally and set a very dangerous precedent. But Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 punishes “any act or series of acts” that constitutes violence against women. This means that a single act of harassment, which translates into violence, would be enough. The object of the law is to protect women and children. Punishing only violence that is repeatedly committed would license isolated ones.
Rustan alleges that today’s women, like Irish, are so used to obscene communications that her getting one could not possibly have produced alarm in her or caused her substantial emotional or psychological distress. He claims having previously exchanged obscene pictures with Irish such that she was already desensitized by them.
But, firstly, the RTC which saw and heard Rustan and his wife give their testimonies was not impressed with their claim that it was Irish who sent the obscene pictures of herself . It is doubtful if the woman in the picture was Irish since her face did not clearly show on them.
Michelle, Rustan’s wife, claimed that she deleted several other pictures that Irish sent but her testimony did not make sense. She said that she did not know that Exhibits 2 to 7 had remained saved after she deleted the pictures. Later, however, she said that she did not have time to delete them. And, if she thought that she had deleted all the pictures from the memory card, then she had no reason at all to keep and hide such memory card. There would have been nothing to hide. Finally, if she knew that some pictures remained in the card, there was no reason for her to keep it for several years, given that as she said she was too jealous to want to see anything connected to Irish. Thus, the RTC was correct in not giving credence to her testimony.
2)The rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action. The Rules on Electronic Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and administrative proceedings.
However, Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility of the obscene picture, Exhibit A, for the first time before this Court. The objection is too late since he should have objected to the admission of the picture on such ground at the time it was offered in evidence. He should be deemed to have already waived such ground for objection.
In conclusion, this Court finds that the prosecution has proved each and every element of the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt.
Nuez Vs. Apao
Facts:Complainant filed an illegal dismissal case against PAGCOR before the Civil Service Commission (CSC). The CSC ordered complainant’s reinstatement but a writ of preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order was issued by the CA in favor of PAGCOR, thus complainant was not reinstated to his former job pending adjudication of the case. Desiring an expeditious decision of his case, Nuez sought the assistance of respondent sometime in July 2004 after learning of the latter’s employment with the CA from her sister, Magdalena David. Nuez communicated to the respondent through telephone conversation and text messages. A week after their first telephone conversation, respondent allegedly told complainant that a favorable and speedy decision of his case was attainable but the person who was to draft the decision was in return asking for One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00).
Complainant expostulated that he did not have that kind of money since he had been jobless for a long time and August of 2004, he sought the assistance of Imbestigador. The crew of the TV program accompanied him to PAOCCF-SPG where he lodged a complaint against respondent for extortion. Thereafter, he communicated with respondent again to verify if the latter was still asking for the money and to set up a meeting with her. Upon learning that respondent’s offer of a favorable decision in exchange for One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) was still standing, the plan for the entrapment operation was formulated by Imbestigador in cooperation with the PAOCC.
On 24 September 2004, complainant and respondent met for the first time in person at the 2nd Floor of Jollibee, Times Plaza Bldg., the place where the entrapment operation was later conducted. Respondent was brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory at the WPD where she was tested and found positive for ultra-violet powder that was previously dusted on the money. She was later detained at the WPD Headquarters.
As evidence, complainant was able to prove by his testimony in conjunction with the text messages from respondent duly presented before the Committee that the latter asked for One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) in exchange for a favorable decision of the former’s pending case with the CA.
Issue: Whether or not the admission of the committee of the evidence taken from the entrapment was legal
Held:The text messages were properly admitted by the Committee since the same are now covered by Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence which provides:
"Ephemeral electronic communication" refers to telephone conversations, text messages . . . and other electronic forms of communication the evidence of which is not recorded or retained."
Under Section 2, Rule 11 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, "Ephemeral electronic communications shall be proven by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or who has personal knowledge thereof . . . ." In this case, complainant who was the recipient of said messages and therefore had personal knowledge thereof testified on their contents and import. Respondent herself admitted that the cellphone number reflected in complainant’s cellphone from which the messages originated was hers. Moreover, any doubt respondent may have had as to the admissibility of the text messages had been laid to rest when she and her counsel signed and attested to the veracity of the text messages between her and complainant. It is also well to remember that in administrative cases, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied. We have no doubt as to the probative value of the text messages as evidence in determining the guilt or lack thereof of respondent in this case.
Narvasa Vs. Sanchez
Facts:The instant case stemmed from three cases of sexual harassment filed separately against respondent by petitioner along with Mary Gay P. de la Cruz and Zenaida M.Gayaton, who are also employees of the LGU.
De la Cruz claimed that, sometime in February, respondent handed her a note saying, “Gay, I like you.” Offended by respondent’s inappropriate remark, de la Cruz admonished him for giving her such a note and told him that she would give the note to his wife. Respondent then grabbed the note from her and tore it into pieces. However, this first incident was followed by a message sent to De la Cruz sometime in March 2002 in which he said, “Ka date ko si Mary Gay… ang tamis nghalik mo.”
As far as petitioner’s complaint was concerned, she asserted that, on November 18, 2000, during a field trip of officers, respondent pulled her towards him and attempted to kiss her. Petitioner resisted and was able to escape the clutches of respondent to rejoin the group that they were travelling with. Respondent apologized to petitioner thrice regarding that incident.
Based on the investigations , respondent was found guilty of all three charges. For the offenses committed against De la Cruz and Gayaton, respondent was meted the penalties of reprimand for his first offense of light harassment and 30 days’ suspension for his first offense of less grave sexual harassment. His transgression against petitioner, however, was deemed to be grave sexual harassment for which he was dismissed from the government service.
On appeal, CSC passed only on the decision in the case filed by petitioner since, under the CSC rules, the penalty of reprimand and/or suspension of not more than 30 days cannot be appealed. The CSC modified the order to grave misconduct however this also has the penalty of dismissal.
Issue: Whether the acts constitute grave or simple misconduct.
Held:Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior. To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected with the performance of the official functions and duties of a public officer. In grave misconduct, as distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of an established rule must be manifest.
Respondent’s acts of grabbing petitioner and attempting to kiss her were, no doubt, intentional. Worse, the incident occurred months after he had made similar but subtler overtures to De la Cruz, who made it clear that his sexual advances were not welcome. Considering that the acts respondent committed against petitioner were much more aggressive, it was impossible that the offensive nature of his actions could have escaped him. It does not appear that petitioner and respondent were carrying on an amorous relationship that might have justified his attempt to kiss petitioner while they were separated from their companions. Worse, as petitioner and respondent were both married (to other persons), respondent not only took his marital status lightly, he also ignored petitioner’s married state, and good character and reputation.
Magtulis vs Salud
Facts:Melchor Lagua was found guilty of homicide before the RTC. On appeal to CA, he was allowed to post a bond for his release. Del Rosario noticed Salud’s (clerk IV) unusual interest in the Lagua case. Salud had apparently been making inquiries whether the appellate court had already directed the issuance of an order of release in the said case and was initially told there was none yet. Due to his persistence, the records of the case were eventually found. Atty. Madarang then directed the typing of the Order of Release Upon Bond, and to notify the mailing section that there were orders requiring personal service. Salud then went to Atty. Madarang’s office and assisted in arranging and stapling the papers for release. He brought the said resolutions and other papers himself to the Mailing Section.
Salud went to the National Penitentiary to serve the order of release of Lagua. Atty. Madarang received a telephone call from a certain Melissa Melchor, asking how much more they had to give to facilitate Lagua’s provisional liberty. The caller also told Madarang that they had sought the help of a certain Rhodora Valdez of the RTC of Pasig, where the criminal case originated, but were told that they still had a balance to be given to Justice Magtolis and Atty. Madarang through the respondent. Atty. Madarang then called the said court and asked to speak to Ms. Valdez, pretending to be Lagua’s relative. What transpired thereafter is contained in Atty. Madarang’s Affidavit dated December 8, 2003.
Justice Magtolis testified that Atty. Madarang reported having received a telephone call from the alleged relative of Lagua. She narrated that she gave the name "Arlyn" to the caller, and, thereafter, exchanged text messages with the respondent. Justice Magtolis instructed Atty. Madarang to continue communicating with the respondent and, if possible, to see it through a possible pay-off where a National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) agent would be asked to assist them. However, the entrapment did not materialize. Nevertheless, the court admitted the text messages as evidence and ruled against Salud.
Salud now claim that the admission of the text messages as evidence against him constitutes a violation of his right to privacy is unavailing. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not text messages may be admitted as evidence
Held:
Text messages have been classified as "ephemeral electronic communication" under Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, and "shall be proven by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has personal knowledge thereof." Any question as to the admissibility of such messages is now moot and academic, as the respondent himself, as well as his counsel, already admitted that he was the sender of the first three messages on Atty. Madarang’s cell phone.
This was also the ruling of the Court in the recent case of Zaldy Nuez v. Elvira Cruz-Apao. In that case, the Court, in finding the respondent therein guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct, considered text messages addressed to the complainant asking for a million pesos in exchange for a favorable decision in a case pending before the CA. The Court had the occasion to state:
… The text messages were properly admitted by the Committee since the same are now covered by Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, which provides:
"Ephemeral electronic communication" refers to telephone conversations, text messages … and other electronic forms of communication the evidence of which is not recorded or retained."
Under Section 2, Rule 11 of the, "Ephemeral electronic communications shall be proven by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or who has personal knowledge thereof … ." In this case, complainant who was the recipient of the said messages and therefore had personal knowledge thereof testified on their contents and import. Respondent herself admitted that the cellphone number reflected in complainant’s cellphone from which the messages originated was hers. Moreover, any doubt respondent may have had as to the admissibility of the text messages had been laid to rest when she and her counsel signed and attested to the veracity of the text messages between her and complainant. It is also well to remember that in administrative cases, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied. We have no doubt as to the probative value of the text messages as evidence in determining the guilt or lack thereof of respondent in this case.
Geroy Vs Calderon
"A magistrate is judged not only by his official acts but also by his private morals, to the extent that such private morals are externalized. He should not only possess proficiency in law but should likewise possess moral integrity for the people look up to him as a virtuous and upright man."
Facts:Petitioner, Eva Lucia Z. Geroy, met respondent Judge Dan R. Calderon through her cousin, Cesar, at a Rotary Club dinner. Thereafter, Geroy proceeded to constantly communicate with her making the impression that he is single or separated as he acted like that.She soon felt abused in her relationship with Judge Calderon, as he would ask her to take pictures of both of them naked after sexual contact; or make her utter vulgar words during sexual intercourse; or when she was requested by Judge Calderon to purchase abortive pills for his son, whose girlfriend was then pregnant. Subsequently, she had become the recipient of threatening calls and text messages from Calderon's wife. Judge Calderon , according to Geroy, soon used abusive and hateful language in addressing her towards the end of their relationship. On the other hand, Judge Calderon claims that from his initial meeting with Geroy at the said Rotary Club event, Geroy had already been hatching a malicious plan to extort money from him. Judge Calderon alleged that Geroy presented herself as one in dire need of financial help, and that, given his generosity, Judge Calderon had only willingly extended help . Soon, according to Judge Calderon, Geroy would appear at his residence unannounced, Judge Calderon, in turn, would invite her into his home and offer her snacks. After a number of such visits, according to Judge Calderon, Geroy started to broach topics with sexual undertones, and made insinuating remarks that it was perfectly fine for married men to have paramours. According to Judge Calderon, he soon firmly turned down her subtle advances and informed her that he would no longer extend her financial help. Thereafter, Geroy started harrassing Judge Calderon and his family, leading him to file a case against her for malicious mischief and slander by deed with the Office of the City Prosecutor.
Geroy counter-charged Judge Calderon for violation of Republic Act (R.A.) 9262 (Violence Against Women and Their Children Act). Judge Calderon's admissions on the witness stand that there indeed existed an illicit relationship between him and Geroy. Geroy, for her part, was also able to reveal intimate facts about Judge Calderon as proof of their romantic relationship, such as the location of skin tags on hidden parts of his body, and knowledge of the ins and outs of Judge Calderon's residence. The Investigating Justice it sufficient to suspend Judge Calderon for six months as penalty for grossly immoral conduct, instead of dismissing him outright from the service, taking into consideration the length of Judge Calderon's service in the judiciary and for the reason that this was the first time that he had been charged for an administrative offense.
Issue:Whether or not Judge Calderon should be dismissed
Held:The Court has not been sparing in its exhortation of judges that they should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities. No position is more demanding as regards the moral righteousness and uprightness of any individual than a seat on the Bench; thus, their personal behavior, not only while in the performance of official duties but also outside the court, must be beyond reproach, for they are, as they so aptly are perceived to be, the visible representation of law and of justice. A judge traces a line of his official as well as personal conduct, a price he has to pay for occupying an exalted position in the judiciary, beyond which he may not freely venture. The complainant, in administrative proceedings, has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the allegations in her complaint, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion; the Court finds that the complainant in this case was able to discharge such burden. As correctly found by the Investigating Justice, Geroy was able to support her charge of immorality against Judge Calderon and has shown that the latter had not exhibited the ideals and principles expected of a magistrate. The disclosure by Geroy of very intimate facts about respondent and respondent's own seemingly innocuous admissions clearly reveal the existence of an illicit affair because the complainant would not have known it if they did not have an affair .The bottom line is that Judge Calderon failed to adhere to the exacting standards of morality and decency which every member of the judiciary is expected to observe. Judge Calderon is a married man, yet he engaged in a romantic relationship with Geroy.
However, the Court does not agree that complainant's guilt or intentions should mitigate respondent's liability.Whatever intentions complainant may have has no bearing on the instant case. As the Court has explained, the purpose of an administrative proceeding is to protect the public service, based on the time-honored principle that a public office is a public trust. And complainants are, in a real sense, only witnesses therein,
The Court agrees, however, that this is respondent's first administrative infraction since he took his office as judge on January 3, 1997. It should be considered as mitigating his liability. In view thereof, the Court finds the recommended penalty of suspension for six months without salary and other benefits, with a stern warning as recommended by the OCA, to be sufficient in this case.
Aznar Vs. Citibank
Facts:Aznar is a holder of a Mastercard issued by Citibank with a credit limit of PhP50,000.00. As he and his wife, Zoraida, planned to take their two grandchildren, on an Asian tour, Aznar made a total advance deposit of PhP485,000.00 with Citibank with the intention of increasing his credit limit to PhP635,000.00.
With the use of his Mastercard, Aznar purchased plane tickets for the trip.Aznar claims that when he presented his Mastercard, the same was not honored. And when he tried to use the same to purchase plane tickets to Bali, it was again dishonored for the reason that his card was blacklisted by Citibank. Such dishonor forced him to buy the tickets in cash. He further claims that his humiliation caused by the denial of his card was aggravated when Ingtan Agency spoke of swindlers trying to use blacklisted cards.
Aznar filed a complaint for damages against Citibank,claiming that Citibank fraudulently or with gross negligence blacklisted his Mastercard which forced him, his wife and grandchildren to abort important tour destinations and prevented them from buying certain items in their tour. He further claimed that he suffered mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, besmirched reputation and social humiliation due to the wrongful blacklisting of his card. To prove that Citibank blacklisted his Mastercard, Aznar presented a computer print-out showing that it was black listed.
Citibank denied the allegation and also contended that under the terms and conditions governing the issuance and use of its credit cards, Citibank is exempt from any liability for the dishonor of its cards by any merchant affiliate.To prove that they did not blacklist Aznar’s card, Citibank’s Credit Card Department Head, Dennis Flores, presented Warning Cancellation Bulletins which contained the list of its canceled cards covering the period of Aznar’s trip.
RTC rendered its decision dismissing Aznar’s complaint for lack of merit. The trial court held that as between the computer print-out presented by Aznar and the Warning Cancellation Bulletins presented by Citibank, the latter had more weight as their due execution and authenticity were duly established by Citibank. A
Issue:
Held:
In the complaint Aznar filed before the RTC, he claimed that Citibank blacklisted his Mastercard which caused its dishonor in several establishments in Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia, particularly in Ingtan Agency in Indonesia where he was humiliated when its staff insinuated that he could be a swindler trying to use a blacklisted card.
The prevailing rule at the time of the promulgation of the RTC Decision is Section 20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. It provides that whenever any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either by (a) anyone who saw the document executed or written; or (b) by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
Aznar, who testified on the authenticity of Exh. "G," did not actually see the document executed or written, neither was he able to provide evidence on the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of Nubi, who handed to him said computer print-out.
Pertinent sections of Rule 5 read:
Section 1. Burden of proving authenticity. – The person seeking to introduce an electronic document in any legal proceeding has the burden of proving its authenticity in the manner provided in this Rule.
Indeed, Aznar failed to demonstrate how the information reflected on the print-out was generated and how the said information could be relied upon as true.
Petition denied.
Diamond vs Deihr
FACTS: This case is regards a patent application claiming invention for a process for molding raw, uncured synthetic rubber into cured precision products. While it was possible, by using well-known time, temperature, and cure relationships, to calculate by means of an established mathematical equation when to open the molding press and remove the cured product, according to respondents, the industry had not been able to measure precisely the temperature inside the press, thus making it difficult to make the necessary computations to determine the proper cure time. Respondents characterized their contribution to the art to reside in the process of constantly measuring the temperature inside the mold and feeding the temperature measurements into a computer that repeatedly recalculates the cure time by use of the mathematical equation and then signals a device to open the press at the proper time. The patent examiner rejected respondents’ claims on the ground that they were drawn to non-statutory subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101, which provides for the issuance of patents.
ISSUE: Whether or not the invention is patentable
HELD: Yes. Respondents’ claims recited subject matter that was eligible for patent protection under § 101. Pp. 450 U. S. 181-193.
In the case of Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U. S. 780, 94 U. S. 788. Industrial processes such as respondents’ claims for transforming raw, uncured synthetic rubber into a different state or thing are the types which have historically been eligible to receive patent law protection. Pp. 450 U. S. 181-184.
While a mathematical formula, like a law of nature, cannot be the subject of a patent, cf. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U. S. 63; Parker v. Page 450 U. S. 176 Flook, 437 U. S. 54, respondents do not seek to patent a mathematical formula, but instead seek protection for a process of curing synthetic rubber. Although their process employs a well-known mathematical equation, they do not seek to preempt the use of that equation, except in conjunction with all of the other steps in their claimed process. A claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula, computer program, or digital computer. Respondents’ claims must be considered as a whole, it being inappropriate to dissect the claims into old and new elements and then to ignore the presence of the old elements in the analysis. The questions of whether a particular invention meets the “novelty” requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 102 or the “nonobviousness” requirements of § 103 do not affect the determination of whether the invention falls into a category of subject matter that is eligible for patent protection under § 101. Pp. 450 U. S. 185-191.
When a claim containing a mathematical formula implements or applies the formula in a structure or process which, when considered as a whole, is performing a function which the patent laws were designed to protect (e.g., transforming or reducing an article to a different state or thing), then the claim satisfies § 101′s requirements. Pp. 450 U. S. 191-193.
Dizon vs. Campo
FACTS: Complainant alleged that respondent is having an illicit relationship with her husband, Dizon. Her husband allegedly admitted his relationship with the woman who was then one month pregnant.
On March 4, 2002, complainant went to the MCTC of Capas, Tarlac, where she confronted respondent about the illicit relationship inside the chamber of Judge Panfilo Valdez, Sr. Respondent allegedly not only admitted her relationship with complainant’s husband but also stated that she was pregnant.Respondent filed a Comment denying the charges hurled against her. She alleged that complainant’s husband became her acquaintance because of their common place of work. Hence, it was not infrequent that she and Arnel would be seen talking with each other in public within the compound of the Municipal Hall. She also denied that she was pregnant and claimed she knew nothing about the alleged admission of Arnel on the matter. To prove the point she submitted a Medical Certificate dated May 5, 2002, attesting to the fact that she did not get pregnant within the preceding three months.
ISSUE: Whether or not the she is guilty of immorality
HELD: The Court affirms the findings of immorality on the part of the respondent reached by the OCA and the investigating judge. However, the penalty they recommended is lower than what respondent deserves.
Instead of rectifying her errant ways after the wife of her paramour had pleaded with her, she continued the illicit relationship and even abhorrently aggravated the situation by marrying complainant’s husband. Interestingly, respondent married him after she stated in her Comment that her relationship with him was purely based on friendship. Respondent cannot feign ignorance of Arnel T. Dizon’s marital status for he was then a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Capas, Tarlac. Someone like respondent who works in the same Municipal Hall must have known of, or at least could have easily verified, the status of Arnel. Even assuming that she was unaware of Arnel’s married status when they first became acquainted with each other, she should have been put on guard when a woman claiming to be his wife pleaded to her to abort her illicit relationship for the sake of the couple’s two children.By agreeing to marry a man during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage to another person, respondent subjected both herself and her paramour to the risk of criminal prosecution
"Ephemeral electronic communication" refers to telephone conversations, text messages . . . and other electronic forms of communication the evidence of which is not recorded or retained."
Facts:Melchor Lagua was found guilty of homicide before the RTC. On appeal to CA, he was allowed to post a bond for his release. Del Rosario noticed Salud’s (clerk IV) unusual interest in the Lagua case. Salud had apparently been making inquiries whether the appellate court had already directed the issuance of an order of release in the said case and was initially told there was none yet. Due to his persistence, the records of the case were eventually found. Atty. Madarang then directed the typing of the Order of Release Upon Bond, and to notify the mailing section that there were orders requiring personal service. Salud then went to Atty. Madarang’s office and assisted in arranging and stapling the papers for release. He brought the said resolutions and other papers himself to the Mailing Section.
Salud went to the National Penitentiary to serve the order of release of Lagua. Atty. Madarang received a telephone call from a certain Melissa Melchor, asking how much more they had to give to facilitate Lagua’s provisional liberty. The caller also told Madarang that they had sought the help of a certain Rhodora Valdez of the RTC of Pasig, where the criminal case originated, but were told that they still had a balance to be given to Justice Magtolis and Atty. Madarang through the respondent. Atty. Madarang then called the said court and asked to speak to Ms. Valdez, pretending to be Lagua’s relative. What transpired thereafter is contained in Atty. Madarang’s Affidavit dated December 8, 2003.
Justice Magtolis testified that Atty. Madarang reported having received a telephone call from the alleged relative of Lagua. She narrated that she gave the name "Arlyn" to the caller, and, thereafter, exchanged text messages with the respondent. Justice Magtolis instructed Atty. Madarang to continue communicating with the respondent and, if possible, to see it through a possible pay-off where a National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) agent would be asked to assist them. However, the entrapment did not materialize. Nevertheless, the court admitted the text messages as evidence and ruled against Salud.
Salud now claim that the admission of the text messages as evidence against him constitutes a violation of his right to privacy is unavailing. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not text messages may be admitted as evidence
Held:
Text messages have been classified as "ephemeral electronic communication" under Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, and "shall be proven by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has personal knowledge thereof." Any question as to the admissibility of such messages is now moot and academic, as the respondent himself, as well as his counsel, already admitted that he was the sender of the first three messages on Atty. Madarang’s cell phone.
This was also the ruling of the Court in the recent case of Zaldy Nuez v. Elvira Cruz-Apao. In that case, the Court, in finding the respondent therein guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct, considered text messages addressed to the complainant asking for a million pesos in exchange for a favorable decision in a case pending before the CA. The Court had the occasion to state:
… The text messages were properly admitted by the Committee since the same are now covered by Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, which provides:
"Ephemeral electronic communication" refers to telephone conversations, text messages … and other electronic forms of communication the evidence of which is not recorded or retained."
Under Section 2, Rule 11 of the, "Ephemeral electronic communications shall be proven by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or who has personal knowledge thereof … ." In this case, complainant who was the recipient of the said messages and therefore had personal knowledge thereof testified on their contents and import. Respondent herself admitted that the cellphone number reflected in complainant’s cellphone from which the messages originated was hers. Moreover, any doubt respondent may have had as to the admissibility of the text messages had been laid to rest when she and her counsel signed and attested to the veracity of the text messages between her and complainant. It is also well to remember that in administrative cases, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied. We have no doubt as to the probative value of the text messages as evidence in determining the guilt or lack thereof of respondent in this case.
Geroy Vs Calderon
"A magistrate is judged not only by his official acts but also by his private morals, to the extent that such private morals are externalized. He should not only possess proficiency in law but should likewise possess moral integrity for the people look up to him as a virtuous and upright man."
Facts:Petitioner, Eva Lucia Z. Geroy, met respondent Judge Dan R. Calderon through her cousin, Cesar, at a Rotary Club dinner. Thereafter, Geroy proceeded to constantly communicate with her making the impression that he is single or separated as he acted like that.She soon felt abused in her relationship with Judge Calderon, as he would ask her to take pictures of both of them naked after sexual contact; or make her utter vulgar words during sexual intercourse; or when she was requested by Judge Calderon to purchase abortive pills for his son, whose girlfriend was then pregnant. Subsequently, she had become the recipient of threatening calls and text messages from Calderon's wife. Judge Calderon , according to Geroy, soon used abusive and hateful language in addressing her towards the end of their relationship. On the other hand, Judge Calderon claims that from his initial meeting with Geroy at the said Rotary Club event, Geroy had already been hatching a malicious plan to extort money from him. Judge Calderon alleged that Geroy presented herself as one in dire need of financial help, and that, given his generosity, Judge Calderon had only willingly extended help . Soon, according to Judge Calderon, Geroy would appear at his residence unannounced, Judge Calderon, in turn, would invite her into his home and offer her snacks. After a number of such visits, according to Judge Calderon, Geroy started to broach topics with sexual undertones, and made insinuating remarks that it was perfectly fine for married men to have paramours. According to Judge Calderon, he soon firmly turned down her subtle advances and informed her that he would no longer extend her financial help. Thereafter, Geroy started harrassing Judge Calderon and his family, leading him to file a case against her for malicious mischief and slander by deed with the Office of the City Prosecutor.
Geroy counter-charged Judge Calderon for violation of Republic Act (R.A.) 9262 (Violence Against Women and Their Children Act). Judge Calderon's admissions on the witness stand that there indeed existed an illicit relationship between him and Geroy. Geroy, for her part, was also able to reveal intimate facts about Judge Calderon as proof of their romantic relationship, such as the location of skin tags on hidden parts of his body, and knowledge of the ins and outs of Judge Calderon's residence. The Investigating Justice it sufficient to suspend Judge Calderon for six months as penalty for grossly immoral conduct, instead of dismissing him outright from the service, taking into consideration the length of Judge Calderon's service in the judiciary and for the reason that this was the first time that he had been charged for an administrative offense.
Issue:Whether or not Judge Calderon should be dismissed
Held:The Court has not been sparing in its exhortation of judges that they should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities. No position is more demanding as regards the moral righteousness and uprightness of any individual than a seat on the Bench; thus, their personal behavior, not only while in the performance of official duties but also outside the court, must be beyond reproach, for they are, as they so aptly are perceived to be, the visible representation of law and of justice. A judge traces a line of his official as well as personal conduct, a price he has to pay for occupying an exalted position in the judiciary, beyond which he may not freely venture. The complainant, in administrative proceedings, has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the allegations in her complaint, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion; the Court finds that the complainant in this case was able to discharge such burden. As correctly found by the Investigating Justice, Geroy was able to support her charge of immorality against Judge Calderon and has shown that the latter had not exhibited the ideals and principles expected of a magistrate. The disclosure by Geroy of very intimate facts about respondent and respondent's own seemingly innocuous admissions clearly reveal the existence of an illicit affair because the complainant would not have known it if they did not have an affair .The bottom line is that Judge Calderon failed to adhere to the exacting standards of morality and decency which every member of the judiciary is expected to observe. Judge Calderon is a married man, yet he engaged in a romantic relationship with Geroy.
However, the Court does not agree that complainant's guilt or intentions should mitigate respondent's liability.Whatever intentions complainant may have has no bearing on the instant case. As the Court has explained, the purpose of an administrative proceeding is to protect the public service, based on the time-honored principle that a public office is a public trust. And complainants are, in a real sense, only witnesses therein,
The Court agrees, however, that this is respondent's first administrative infraction since he took his office as judge on January 3, 1997. It should be considered as mitigating his liability. In view thereof, the Court finds the recommended penalty of suspension for six months without salary and other benefits, with a stern warning as recommended by the OCA, to be sufficient in this case.
Aznar Vs. Citibank
Facts:Aznar is a holder of a Mastercard issued by Citibank with a credit limit of PhP50,000.00. As he and his wife, Zoraida, planned to take their two grandchildren, on an Asian tour, Aznar made a total advance deposit of PhP485,000.00 with Citibank with the intention of increasing his credit limit to PhP635,000.00.
With the use of his Mastercard, Aznar purchased plane tickets for the trip.Aznar claims that when he presented his Mastercard, the same was not honored. And when he tried to use the same to purchase plane tickets to Bali, it was again dishonored for the reason that his card was blacklisted by Citibank. Such dishonor forced him to buy the tickets in cash. He further claims that his humiliation caused by the denial of his card was aggravated when Ingtan Agency spoke of swindlers trying to use blacklisted cards.
Aznar filed a complaint for damages against Citibank,claiming that Citibank fraudulently or with gross negligence blacklisted his Mastercard which forced him, his wife and grandchildren to abort important tour destinations and prevented them from buying certain items in their tour. He further claimed that he suffered mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, besmirched reputation and social humiliation due to the wrongful blacklisting of his card. To prove that Citibank blacklisted his Mastercard, Aznar presented a computer print-out showing that it was black listed.
Citibank denied the allegation and also contended that under the terms and conditions governing the issuance and use of its credit cards, Citibank is exempt from any liability for the dishonor of its cards by any merchant affiliate.To prove that they did not blacklist Aznar’s card, Citibank’s Credit Card Department Head, Dennis Flores, presented Warning Cancellation Bulletins which contained the list of its canceled cards covering the period of Aznar’s trip.
RTC rendered its decision dismissing Aznar’s complaint for lack of merit. The trial court held that as between the computer print-out presented by Aznar and the Warning Cancellation Bulletins presented by Citibank, the latter had more weight as their due execution and authenticity were duly established by Citibank. A
Issue:
Whether or not the evidence presented by Aznar is sufficient to make citibank liable?
Held:
It is basic that in civil cases, the burden of proof rests on the plaintiff to establish his case based on a preponderance of evidence. The party that alleges a fact also has the burden of proving it.
In the complaint Aznar filed before the RTC, he claimed that Citibank blacklisted his Mastercard which caused its dishonor in several establishments in Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia, particularly in Ingtan Agency in Indonesia where he was humiliated when its staff insinuated that he could be a swindler trying to use a blacklisted card.
Aznar puts much weight on the ON-LINE AUTHORIZATION FOREIGN ACCOUNT ACTIVITY REPORT, a computer print-out handed to Aznar by Ingtan Agency, marked as Exh. "G", to prove that his Mastercard was dishonored for being blacklisted. On said print-out appears the words "DECL OVERLIMIT" opposite Account No. 5423-3920-0786-7012.
As correctly pointed out by the RTC and the CA, however, such exhibit cannot be considered admissible as its authenticity and due execution were not sufficiently established by petitioner.
The prevailing rule at the time of the promulgation of the RTC Decision is Section 20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. It provides that whenever any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either by (a) anyone who saw the document executed or written; or (b) by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
Aznar, who testified on the authenticity of Exh. "G," did not actually see the document executed or written, neither was he able to provide evidence on the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of Nubi, who handed to him said computer print-out.
Even if examined under the Rules on Electronic Evidence, which took effect on August 1, 2001, and which is being invoked by Aznar in this case, the authentication of Exh. "G" would still be found wanting.
Pertinent sections of Rule 5 read:
Section 1. Burden of proving authenticity. – The person seeking to introduce an electronic document in any legal proceeding has the burden of proving its authenticity in the manner provided in this Rule.
Section 2. Manner of authentication. – Before any private electronic document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its authenticity must be proved by any of the following means:
(a) by evidence that it had been digitally signed by the person purported to have signed the same;
(b) by evidence that other appropriate security procedures or devices as may be authorized by the Supreme Court or by law for authentication of electronic documents were applied to the document; or
(c) by other evidence showing its integrity and reliability to the satisfaction of the judge.
Indeed, Aznar failed to demonstrate how the information reflected on the print-out was generated and how the said information could be relied upon as true.
Petition denied.
Diamond vs Deihr
FACTS: This case is regards a patent application claiming invention for a process for molding raw, uncured synthetic rubber into cured precision products. While it was possible, by using well-known time, temperature, and cure relationships, to calculate by means of an established mathematical equation when to open the molding press and remove the cured product, according to respondents, the industry had not been able to measure precisely the temperature inside the press, thus making it difficult to make the necessary computations to determine the proper cure time. Respondents characterized their contribution to the art to reside in the process of constantly measuring the temperature inside the mold and feeding the temperature measurements into a computer that repeatedly recalculates the cure time by use of the mathematical equation and then signals a device to open the press at the proper time. The patent examiner rejected respondents’ claims on the ground that they were drawn to non-statutory subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101, which provides for the issuance of patents.
ISSUE: Whether or not the invention is patentable
HELD: Yes. Respondents’ claims recited subject matter that was eligible for patent protection under § 101. Pp. 450 U. S. 181-193.
In the case of Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U. S. 780, 94 U. S. 788. Industrial processes such as respondents’ claims for transforming raw, uncured synthetic rubber into a different state or thing are the types which have historically been eligible to receive patent law protection. Pp. 450 U. S. 181-184.
While a mathematical formula, like a law of nature, cannot be the subject of a patent, cf. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U. S. 63; Parker v. Page 450 U. S. 176 Flook, 437 U. S. 54, respondents do not seek to patent a mathematical formula, but instead seek protection for a process of curing synthetic rubber. Although their process employs a well-known mathematical equation, they do not seek to preempt the use of that equation, except in conjunction with all of the other steps in their claimed process. A claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula, computer program, or digital computer. Respondents’ claims must be considered as a whole, it being inappropriate to dissect the claims into old and new elements and then to ignore the presence of the old elements in the analysis. The questions of whether a particular invention meets the “novelty” requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 102 or the “nonobviousness” requirements of § 103 do not affect the determination of whether the invention falls into a category of subject matter that is eligible for patent protection under § 101. Pp. 450 U. S. 185-191.
When a claim containing a mathematical formula implements or applies the formula in a structure or process which, when considered as a whole, is performing a function which the patent laws were designed to protect (e.g., transforming or reducing an article to a different state or thing), then the claim satisfies § 101′s requirements. Pp. 450 U. S. 191-193.
Dizon vs. Campo
FACTS: Complainant alleged that respondent is having an illicit relationship with her husband, Dizon. Her husband allegedly admitted his relationship with the woman who was then one month pregnant.
On March 4, 2002, complainant went to the MCTC of Capas, Tarlac, where she confronted respondent about the illicit relationship inside the chamber of Judge Panfilo Valdez, Sr. Respondent allegedly not only admitted her relationship with complainant’s husband but also stated that she was pregnant.Respondent filed a Comment denying the charges hurled against her. She alleged that complainant’s husband became her acquaintance because of their common place of work. Hence, it was not infrequent that she and Arnel would be seen talking with each other in public within the compound of the Municipal Hall. She also denied that she was pregnant and claimed she knew nothing about the alleged admission of Arnel on the matter. To prove the point she submitted a Medical Certificate dated May 5, 2002, attesting to the fact that she did not get pregnant within the preceding three months.
ISSUE: Whether or not the she is guilty of immorality
HELD: The Court affirms the findings of immorality on the part of the respondent reached by the OCA and the investigating judge. However, the penalty they recommended is lower than what respondent deserves.
Instead of rectifying her errant ways after the wife of her paramour had pleaded with her, she continued the illicit relationship and even abhorrently aggravated the situation by marrying complainant’s husband. Interestingly, respondent married him after she stated in her Comment that her relationship with him was purely based on friendship. Respondent cannot feign ignorance of Arnel T. Dizon’s marital status for he was then a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Capas, Tarlac. Someone like respondent who works in the same Municipal Hall must have known of, or at least could have easily verified, the status of Arnel. Even assuming that she was unaware of Arnel’s married status when they first became acquainted with each other, she should have been put on guard when a woman claiming to be his wife pleaded to her to abort her illicit relationship for the sake of the couple’s two children.By agreeing to marry a man during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage to another person, respondent subjected both herself and her paramour to the risk of criminal prosecution
